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Abstract
One-class spoofing detection approaches have been an
effective alternative to the two-class learners in the face
presentation attack detection particularly in unseen attack
scenarios. We propose an ensemble based anomaly detec-
tion approach applicable to one-class classifiers. A new
score normalisation method is proposed to normalise the
output of individual outlier detectors before fusion. To com-
ply with the accuracy and diversity objectives for the com-
ponent classifiers, three different strategies are utilised to
build a pool of anomaly experts. To boost the performance,
we also make use of the client-specific information both in
the design of individual experts as well as in setting a dis-
tinct threshold for each client. We carry out extensive exper-
iments on three face anti-spoofing datasets and show that
the proposed ensemble approaches are comparable supe-
rior to the techniques based on the two-class formulation
or class-independent settings. ∗
1. Introduction
Although biometric systems have made a remarkable
progress in recent years, they are potentially vulnerable to
face spoofing attacks, especially to unseen types of presen-
tation attacks (PA). A spoofing attack occurs when an im-
postor tries to fool a face recognition system by using PAs to
authenticate himself/herself as a genuine client. The most
common face PAs in practice include print attack, replay
attack, and 3D masks. To prevent spoofing attacks, face
recognition systems should be equipped with highly capa-
ble countermeasures to reduce the security concerns of un-
known attack attempts.
To counteract PAs, the majority of approaches in the
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literature formulate the face spoofing problem as a binary
classification task in which a spoofing detector tries to learn
distinguishable features separating genuine accesses from
spoofing attacks [24]. However, the two-class formula-
tion has shown some drawbacks in the real-world spoof-
ing scenarios[15]. To address this drawback, anomaly de-
tection based models have been proposed in recent studies
[3, 15] as alternative spoofing detection systems. To con-
struct anomaly classifiers, researchers have considered three
broad categories: (i) Learning with positive samples only
(ii) Learning with positive samples and small proportion of
negative samples (iii) Learning with positive and unlabelled
data. In this paper, we adopt the same anomaly detection ap-
proach in [3, 15] by building spoofing detectors using only
genuine accesses data, corresponding to category (i).
The majority of existing studies in the spoofing attack
detection assume that the relevant information is indepen-
dent of the class identity. However, it is reasonable to ar-
gue that anti-spoofing systems are likely to be more suc-
cessful if specific biometric traits of individual clients are
considered. The benefit of using client-specific information
has been first recognised in [8].However, the idea was in-
vestigated in the context of a two-class anomaly detection
model, and this requires access to all variations of spoof-
ing attacks in the enrolment stage, which is unrealistic in
practical scenarios. To overcome this limitation, authors in
[15] proposed a way to use client-specific information to
train anomaly classifiers by using only genuine accesses. In
this paper, we investigate the merits of using client-specific
information for fusion of anomaly classifiers and setting a
subject-specific decision threshold for them.
In the quest to increase the generalisation capacity of
spoofing detectors, a number of authors have proposed en-
semble techniques to improve the spoofing detection per-
formance by combining the decisions of individual classi-
fiers [2, 22]. An ensemble of classifiers thrives if individ-
ual members are accurate and diverse. In this paper, three
approaches are adopted to create POC. They include one-
class Support Vector Machines (SVM), Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMM), and Mahalanobis Distance outlier detector
(MD) which have all shown to achieve a remarkable de-
gree of success in spoofing detection [3]. Next, seven dif-
ferent regions of the face are considered to inject diversity
in the performance of one-class classifier designs. Third,
motivated by the promising results achieved by deep Con-
volutional Neural Networks (CNN) [38, 29, 22] compared
to traditional feature extraction methods such as LBP[26]
and BSIF[18], our anomaly classifiers are trained using the
CNN representations of face data as input.
Some ensemble techniques for combining one-class
classifiers have been studied outside the field of biometrics
[4, 19], but never applied to the spoofing detection problem.
Our aim is to redress this issue by proposing a simple fu-
sion method based on a novel score normalisation strategy,
which is particularly relevant for biometrics, as it allows a
consistent control of false rejection rates. We combine one-
class classifiers in a pool to improve the accuracy of spoof-
ing attack detection. In previous studies, even if the compo-
nent classifiers are designed using genuine access data only,
their fusion in an ensemble is facilitated with the help of
spoofing attack samples [4]. We develop a fusion method
based on weighted averaging of component classifiers us-
ing Genetic Algorithms (GA). The GA is a very popular
optimisation method due to its simplicity, minimal require-
ments, ease of parallelism, and robustness. Although GA
fusion approach is very effective, it compromises the phi-
losophy of anomaly detection. In order to adhere fully to
the spirit of anomaly detection, we also propose a fusion
method for combining one-class spoofing attack detectors,
which is trained on genuine access samples only.
We evaluate the proposed solutions on the existing anti-
spoofing datasets, namely Replay-Attack [7] and Replay-
Mobile [10] to make a fair comparison with the state of the
art studies. We also perform experiments on the ROSE-
Youtu [21] dataset, which is more challenging, as it con-
tains spoof samples of higher resolution and imaging qual-
ity, covering a diverse variety of illumination conditions,
camera sources, and a wider spectrum of attack categories.
We advocate the same evaluation protocol proposed in [15]
to implement a client-specific variant of the anomaly detec-
tion approach in the ROSE-Youtu dataset.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows: a) We develop a solution for the face spoofing de-
tection problem by fusing multiple anomaly experts. A pool
of 63 learners has been generated by creating different com-
bination from the set of three anomaly detectors, seven re-
gions of face and three CNN architectures. b) We propose a
novel normalisation approach to support a multiple spoofing
detector fusion using normal data only. c) We adopt a client-
specific approach for the design of both, individual spoofing
attack detectors as well as ensemble models. d) By means
of extensive experiments, we demonstrate that the proposed
subject-specific anomaly detector fusion achieves superior
performance compared to other methods.
2. Ensemble of spoofing attack detection ex-
perts
The key prerequisite of classifier fusion is to create a
POC, in our case a pool of face spoofing attack detec-
tors, that are diverse and have the capacity to provide com-
plementary information to enhance the recognition perfor-
mance. There are different strategies to construct a POC.
They include i) training set manipulation (bagging, boost-
ing), ii) the use of different classifier models, iii) alternative
classifier model parameterisations, iv) use of complemen-
tary data modalities, v) resorting to different subspaces. The
aim of this paper is not to conduct an exhaustive exploration
of different designs. Rather, the goal is to investigate the po-
tential of multiple one-class classifier fusion. In this context
we created our pool using simple mechanisms which can
broadly be classified into the categories ii) and v) above. In
particular, we use different regions of the face to define dif-
ferent subspaces, and different anomaly detection models.
We also inject diversity by using different features extracted
from the input data. Here we limit ourselves to deep neural
network features obtained using different pretrained CNNs.
The combination of a particular region, feature representa-
tion and classification model produces one expert for the
ensemble.
The different mechanisms used are described in the fol-
lowing Subsections. In Subsection 2.1 we define the various
facial regions providing an input to a spoofing attack detec-
tor. These regions are fed into pretrained neural networks
described in Subsection 2.2 to produce different features for
the anomaly detection process. Subsection 2.3 introduces
the one-class classifiers selected for our study.
2.1. Facial Regions
Different parts of the face present distinct input infor-
mation for decision making and by definition introduce di-
versity. At the same time, as different regions of the face
exhibit disparate degree of appearance variation induced by
changing expressions and talking face dynamics, selecting
different regions provides the opportunity to identify facial
parts that have the propensity to convey spoofing anoma-
lies in a more reliable manner. Figure 1 illustrates the way
in which the face image is divided into seven different re-
gions. As can be seen in Figure 1, the majority of the face
regions contain the eyes which have been extensively stud-
ied in spoofing detection. To extract the original face from
a video frame, first a given frame is cropped according to its
corresponding face bounding box which is provided as part
of the dataset annotation. The original image is cropped by
a tighter bounding box to minimise the effect of background
on the spoofing detection performance. This process leads
Figure 1. The original face is divided to seven different regions.
to the construction of Region 1 which serves as a new tem-
plate to extract the remaining six facial regions. To assess
the merits of the eyes region which has been investigated
in liveness based spoofing attack detection [33], both eyes,
right eye and left eye regions are extracted to form Regions
2, 3, and 4 respectively. Region 5 and Region 6 focus on the
nose part of the face which has been studied extensively in
the landmark detection applications [30]. Finally, Region 7
is adopted to capture the mouth and lips.
2.2. Access Data Representation
The gamut of image data representations used for face
spoofing detection is very extensive. They include LBPs,
LPQs [27], and image quality features [16]. Their relative
effectiveness has been investigated in [3]. With the advent
of deep learning, the recent research has also looked at the
potential of features extracted by deep neural networks [13].
The motivation for investigating CNN features was to estab-
lish whether face spoofing detectors could use the same rep-
resentation as face matching. In [15] it has been found that
CNN features are very powerful. In addition, their adop-
tion could greatly simplify the design of biometric systems.
Here we adhere to the same philosophy and limit our study
to CNN features only. As in [15], we consider CNN features
extracted by networks such as GoogleNet [32], ResNet50
[17] and VGG-verydeep-16 (VD16) [31] tuned to extract
powerful representation for face matching, as well as fea-
tures output by CNN networks pretrained for other tasks.
2.3. Anomaly Classifiers
Anomaly detection is the identification of unusual data
points deviating from the behaviour of the majority of the
data. To construct an anomaly detector in spoofing sce-
narios, only real data can be used to train one-class clas-
sifiers. Spoofing samples are only considered in the evalu-
ation stage. This paper adheres to the same anomaly detec-
tion philosophy according to which one-class classifiers are
trained on genuine access data only. The anomaly detectors
used in this paper are as follows:
One-CLASS SVM: Support Vector Data Description
(SVDD) [34] is a one-class extension of SVM. SVDD en-
closes the normal training data by a minimum radius hy-
persphere. Outliers of the model can be flagged as the test
samples falling outside the hypershpere.
One-CLASS MD: Assuming that genuine access data
follows a single-mode Gaussian distribution, the Maha-
lanobis distance of a test sample to the mean can serve as
an output of a one-class MD spoofing detector.
One-CLASS GMM: A Gaussian mixture model is
a parametric probability density function defined as a
weighted sum of Gaussian component densities. Its model
parameters are estimated using the Expectation Maximiza-
tion algorithm [11]. Outliers are detected by measuring the
minimum MD to the respective mixture components.
2.3.1 Client-Specific versus Client Independent
Anomaly Detection
The principal assumption to formulate spoofing detection
problem with one-class classification scheme is that spoof-
ing attacks would generate scores deviating from normal
scores, and could be detected as outliers of the normal
scores distribution. To this end, a threshold should be set at
a predefined level of confidence to reject a given proportion
(usually 1-15%) of normal scores. If a development set was
available, this can be done by predetermining a threshold
so that the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Accep-
tance Rate (FAR) are balanced, which produces an equal
error rate (EER). In the anomaly formulation adopted here
the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) would correspond to the
operation point defined by the selected level of confidence.
In the majority of cases, class-independent thresholds fail to
perform effectively because when the data of various clients
are merged into a single population in an ensemble, it be-
comes much harder to find a single threshold that can be
applied to various clients jointly. This limitation is depicted
in Figure 2. To address this problem, first, we combine clas-
sification scores of POC spoofing detectors categorised by
client specific information of each subject. Next, we set a
client specific threshold for each population of scores ac-
cordingly.
3. Fusion of anomaly detection experts
3.1. Literature
To date, the investigation of the merits of fusing anomaly
classifiers has been frequently confined to other applica-
tions rather than biometrics. To combine one-class classi-
fiers, authors in [35] argued that if their outputs are stan-
dardised first, then it is possible to use traditional combi-
nation rules such as mean vote, mean weighted vote, prod-
Figure 2. Score distributions of two clients from Replay-Mobile
dataset using MD classifier and GoogleNet [32] features.
uct of the weighted votes, mean of the estimated probabili-
ties, and product combination of the estimated probabilities
for classifier fusion. The authors in [20] demonstrated the
merits of using SVDDs fusion for image database retrieval
which leads to improved retrieval precision. In another
work [25], the authors combined several anomaly classi-
fiers using the random subspace approach for the purpose
of online signature verification, leading to a reduction of er-
ror rate. The authors in [5] proposed fusion of one-class
SVMs for biometric applications. They used z-score, min-
max, and column norm normalisation approaches to com-
bine classification outputs. They experimentally concluded
that min-max normalisation with weighted sum gives the
best result. Another work [12] proposed an ensemble of
one-class fuzzy KNN classifiers optimised by genetic algo-
rithms to produce fused similarity measures. They showed
that with the optimal parameters, the overall recognition
rate improves in the majority of cases.
It cannot be overemphasised that when we have only
normal access data for training, there are not many op-
tions available for expert fusion. We cannot even consider
weighted averaging, as it is difficult to define an objective
function that could be optimised to find the best mixing of
scores. This situation is different when some samples from
the negative distribution are available. Such a scenario will
be discussed in Section 3.3. First we discuss simple aver-
aging in Section 3.3 and show its expected benefits. A pre-
requisite is an effective score normalisation targeted for the
spoofing attack detection application, which is the subject
of the next Subsection.
3.2. Confidence level score normalisation
Let us consider K anomaly detection experts, each pro-
ducing score si, i = 1, ...,K. Score si represents a measure
of affinity of an observation with the ith outlier detection
model built using a set of training observations, all corre-
sponding to normal accesses. We conjecture that it should
be possible to benefit from the multiple expert opinions by
combining them using a very simple fusion rule, namely the
sum rule. As the scores of different experts may be quite
disparate in terms of their range of values, before apply-
ing the simple fusion rule, they have to be normalised. We
could opt for a variety of normalisation procedures, such as
scaling by max−min, a zero mean - unit variance normali-
sation, etc. In order to be consistent with the spirit of outlier
detection, we shall normalise the scores by scaling so that
for each expert a selected confidence level threshold ρmaps
to unity. Thus for each expert the proportion of normal sam-
ples lying under the tail of the score distribution above point
1 equals 1− ρ. Let the confidence level cut off point for the
distribution of scores si be si(ρ). The normalised score s˜i
is then given by
s˜i =
si
si(ρ)
(1)
Note that for a 100% confidence level, the proposed score
normalisation will be the same as dividing by the maximum
score. For different confidence levels the normalisation fac-
tor in the denominator will differ.
3.3. Fusion by Averaging
In the simple averaging fusion, which does not require
any attack data for training, the final prediction of the given
sample of x, denoted by H(x), is obtained by averaging the
outputs of individual classifiers directly as follows:
H(x) =
1
K
K∑
i=1
s˜i (2)
To reflect the relative importance of individual experts, spe-
cific weights wi may be assigned to the respective compo-
nent classifiers. The combined output of weighted averag-
ing is obtained as follows:
H(x) =
1
K
K∑
i=1
wis˜i (3)
However, to train a weighted averaging system, some attack
samples are required. In the present work, GA is adopted
for computing the optimum weights in eq. (3). In GA, de-
signing chromosome and fitness function plays an impor-
tant role since they affect the complexity of the optimisation
problem. As depicted in Figure 3, a novel encoding strategy
is proposed to design a chromosome for the GA optimisa-
tion. It reflects the importance of each CNN, classifier, and
region for the spoofing attack detection task. Each chromo-
some translates into a fused score via an exponential func-
tion defined as
H(x) =
1
RKN
R∑
r=1
L∑
l=1
N∑
n=1
2(w
R
r +w
K
k +w
N
n )s˜r,l,n (4)
where s˜r,l,n is the score for the given frame x obtained
from the r-th facial region, l-th anomaly classifier, and n-
th CNN. The exponential weights rather than linear ones are
applied to magnify the differences among the weights and to
speed up the computation. The objective of the fitness func-
tion is to select those chromosomes achieving the lowest
HTERs with the fused scores H(x). Both, genuine access
and attack data are used for the optimisation. According to
Figure 3. The proposed chromosome structure containing 13 genes
that includes seven regions, three classifiers and three CNNs.
Figure 3, the first R=7 genes convey the importance of the
different regions. The next L=3 genes represent the weight-
ing of the anomaly experts while the last N=3 genes desig-
nate the significance of each CNN. To initialise the weights
in the first step of GA, a random integer value between zero
and ten is assigned to each gene. Consequently, an objec-
tive of the fitness function in this paper is to minimise the
HTER.
4. Experiments
The aim of the experiments described in this section
is to evaluate the proposed fusion solutions and compare
them with other one-class and multiclass classification ap-
proaches. Experiments are performed on three benchmark
anti-spoofing datasets. Details regarding the implementa-
tion and the experimental protocols are discussed in the sub-
sequent sections.
4.1. Datasets and Protocols
Three public face spoofing datasets, namely Replay-
Attack, Replay-Mobile, and Rose-Youtu are used in our ex-
periments. Replay-Attack contains 1300 videos with low-
resolution while Replay-Mobile consists of 1200 videos
with high-resolution. ROSE-Youtu is a comprehensive anti-
spoofing dataset with 3350 videos covering a large vari-
ety of illumination conditions, camera models, and attack
types. As noted earlier, to be consistent with the spirit of
the anomaly detection formulation, only real-access data is
used to build both class-specific and class-independent ap-
proaches. For Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile datasets,
the enrolment set available for each client is used for train-
ing the class-specific and class-independent approaches.
Since enrolment set is not included in the Rose-Youtu
dataset, we follow the evaluation protocol in [15] to imple-
ment the class-specific approaches.
4.2. Implementation Details
Before feeding video sequences to the pre-trained CNNs,
each frame is photometrically normalised using the retina
method [37] to reduce the negative impact of different light-
ing conditions. For the Rose-Youtu dataset, face bounding
Table 1. The HTERs of two different client of Replay-Mobile
dataset based on two scenarios.
Client ID 4 Client ID 19
GoogleNet Region 1
Region 1 Region 7 GoogleNet ResNet50 VD16
MAH-Spec 26.15 11.94 4.03 4.25 4.22
GMM-Spec 32.33 13.77 4.54 3.12 1.35
SVM-Spec 40.77 14.04 16.26 4.54 1.09
boxes are detected by the Viola-Jones algorithm [36]. Fea-
tures of the pre-ultimate layer of each network serve as an
input to the anomaly detectors. The one-class SVM classi-
fier implementation is based on the SVDD classifier from
the LIBSVM [9]. In the case of the MD model, the param-
eters of the Gaussian distribution of the feature vector are
estimated using the training data. For each test sample, the
Mahalanobis distance is computed as a spoofing detection
score. For the GMM classifier, the minimum Mahalanobis
distance of the test sample from all K components is re-
garded as the spoofing detection score. The value of K is
set for each dataset based on experimental optimisation. To
use GA in the proposed weighted averaging fusion, we set
the value of the initialisation population, crossover rate, and
mutation rate to 20, 0.4, and 0.1, respectively.
4.3. Results
Extensive experiments are carried out in this section to
compare the performance of the proposed ensemble tech-
niques with traditional single classification systems. In Ta-
ble 1, two different settings are used to demonstrate the mer-
its of using different class-specific classifiers, networks, and
face regions in the fusion. According to Table 1, HTERs
of the particular client (ID=4) in the Replay-Mobile dataset
are reported according to the representations of GoogleNet
for Region 1 and Region 7. Surprisingly, Region 7 out-
performs Region 1, which corresponds to the whole image,
by more than 15% in terms of HTER. For the other client
(ID=19), the representation provided by GoogleNet is the
best for Class-specific MAH while VD16 is the best CNN
for GMM and SVM.
In Table 2, the performance of the individually best
class-specific and class-independent classifiers is reported.
According to Table 2, all class-specific anomaly detectors
outperform class-independent ones significantly. It is inter-
esting that in Replay-Attack, all variations of class-specific
detectors are almost five times better than class-independent
ones. For the Replay-Mobile and Rose-Youtu, there is still a
considerable gain of roughly 3% in using the class-specific
settings. Table 3 compares the HTERs performance of sin-
gle class-specific anomaly classifiers against the proposed
ensemble solutions. According to Table 3, the proposed
simple averaging fusion is superior to their individual mem-
bers by around 1% in Replay-Mobile and Replay-Attack
datasets. This remains the same for Rose-Youtu with nearly
Table 2. The HTER results of class-Specific approaches vs. class-
independent ones
Class-Specific Class-Independent
MAH GMM SVM MAH GMM SVM
Replay-Mobile 13.57 13.14 13.90 16.57 18.85 16.99
Replay-Attack 2.39 2.19 6.23 12.75 9.96 24.21
Rose-Youtu 13.24 11.73 18.24 18.26 17.54 22.57
Table 3. Comparison between the proposed ensemble solutions
and single best classifier in terms of HTER for each dataset.
Single Best CS Simple Averaging Weighted Averaging
Replay-Mobile 13.14 12.19 9.95
Replay-Attack 2.49 1.57 1.43
Rose-Youtu 11.73 11.21 9.30
Table 4. Comparison between the proposed weighted averaging
ensemble and other approaches in terms of HTER for each dataset.
Weighted Averaging Other Approaches
Replay-Mobile 9.95 10.40 [1] 17.20 [7]
Replay-Attack 1.43 3.13 [28] 1.24 [14]
Rose-Youtu 9.3 26.6 [23] 16.40 [6]
0.5% improvement in HTER. Similarly, for the proposed
weighted averaging, HTERs of Replay-Mobile and Rose-
Youtu improve by more than 3% and 2% respectively while
Replay-Attack gains nearly 1% improvement.
As seen in Table 4, to compare our best solution,
weighted averaging, with the state of the art methods us-
ing two-class classification schemes, HTER of 9.95% in
Replay-Mobile dataset is better than 10.40% in [1] and
17.20% in [7]. For the Replay-Attack dataset, our HTER of
1.43% is better than 3.13% in [28] and slightly worse than
1.24 in [14]. In Rose-Youtu dataset, HTER of 9.30% is by
far better than 26.6% in [23] and 16.4% in [6]. It cannot
be overemphasised that spoof samples are used only during
training to determine the optimal weights of the fusion rule
in eq. (4). The spoofing detector design for new clients in
the practical use case is purely based on real data only.
In summary, we show that the fusion of different regions,
classifiers, and networks can boost the performance of face
spoofing detection in all experimental datasets. In addi-
tion, class-specific approaches perform consistently better
than class-independent methods in benchmark datasets. The
proposed ensemble solution based on GA optimisation pro-
duces superior performance, as compared to the individual
members. Interestingly, our proposed weighted averaging
outperforms conventional multiclass classification systems,
confirming the merits of the anomaly detection formulation
adopted for our face spoofing detection problem.
5. Conclusion
Inspired by the promising performance of ensemble
learning and the anomaly based approach to face spoofing
detection, we proposed novel ensemble techniques based
on simple averaging and weighted averaging to fuse one-
class classifiers. To exploit the benefits of anomaly classi-
fiers learning using only normal data, we introduced a novel
normalisation method to combine the outputs of one-class
classifiers trained exclusively using genuine access data.
Motivated by the benefits of the subject-specific solutions
to the face spoofing detection, we proposed an extension
of the client-specific one-class classifiers involving subject-
specific thresholds to capitalise on their ability to be the
members of an ensemble learner. To create a pool of spoof-
ing detectors, seven regions of face, three one-class classi-
fiers, and the representations of three CNNs are utilised to
constitute 63 different spoofing detector designs. Extensive
experiments involving three spoofing datasets confirmed the
merits of the client-specific one-class classifier fusion. The
experiments were conducted using the existing protocols for
the Replay-Mobile and Replay-Attack datasets as well as
our new proposed protocol for the Rose-Youtu dataset. The
reported results demonstrate that the proposed model yields
promising performance compared to the class-independent
formulation as well as to conventional multiclass classifica-
tion models.
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